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**Natural Language Ontology**

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Natural language ontologyis the study of the ontology (ontological categories, structures, and notions) reflected in natural language. It is a sub-discipline of both philosophy and linguistics. More specifically, natural language ontology is part of both natural language semantics and metaphysics.

Natural language ontology is a new discipline that has emerged with the development of natural language semantics. It has been suggested as a discipline first by semanticists (Bach 1986).[[1]](#footnote-1) Research in natural language semantics that falls under natural language ontology includes research on event and trope reference, plurals, mass nouns, tense, aspect, and modality. Research in philosophy (or the philosophy-linguistic) falls under natural language ontology when it deals with ontology as reflected in linguistically manifest intuitions.

Natural language ontology, however, is not just an emerging discipline. It has also been a practice throughout the history of philosophy. Philosophers throughout history, at times more often than others, have appealed to natural language to motivate an ontological view or notion, and when they did so, it is fair to say, they practiced natural language ontology. Such an appeal to natural language can be found already in Aristotle and very explicitly in medieval metaphysics (Ockham, Aquinus, Buridan), in the phenomenological tradition (Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, Bolzano), as well as in early analytic philosophy (Frege, Twardowski, Strawson, Austin, Vendler, Ryle).

The appeal to natural language in the history of philosophy had often been based on the assumption that natural language just reflects reality. More recently, though, the view has established itself among philosophers that natural language does not in fact reflect the ontology of what there really is, but rather comes with its own ontology, an ontology that may be quite different from the ontology of the real or fundamental.

 Natural language ontology as a subdiscipline of both linguistics and philosophy raises the following general questions that this paper will address:

[1] How does the semantics of natural language involve ontology and thus in what sense is natural language ontology part of linguistics?

[2] How does natural language ontology situate itself within metaphysics and thus is part of metaphysics?

[3] What sorts of linguistic data reflect the ontology implicit in language, and how is that ontology itself to be understood?

[4] What is distinctive about the ontology of natural language and what sorts of conditions does this impose on an ontological theory?

**1. The role of ontology in the semantics of natural language**

**1.1. Ways of the reflection of ontology in natural language**

How does natural language reflect ontology? The semantics of natural languages involves entities of various ontological categories, ontological structures, and ontological notions on the basis of syntactic roles of expressions, syntactic categories and features, and lexical words.

 First of all, entities may play various roles in the semantic structure of natural language sentences (in what way exactly may depend somewhat on particular semantic theories about relevant constructions or expressions). Most importantly, entities play a role as the semantic values of referential noun phrases (NPs) as well as the things that quantificational NPs range over. Moreover, entities play a role as arguments of predicates. Natural language contains a wealth of expressions referring to or quantifying over entities, and it comes with a wealth of expressions that express properties of entities (or relations among them). Thus, in *John owns the building*, the referential NPs *John* and *the building* stand for entities, and *own* is a predicates expressing a relation among entities that is attributed to them.

 The notion of a referential NP is equally important in linguistics and in philosophy. Referential NPs generally are considered occurrences of NPs in sentences on which they have the function of standing for objects. Proper names and definite NPs can serve as referential NPs, as can specific indefinites and certain determinerless (bare) plurals and mass nouns. There are various syntactic and semantic criteria for referential NPs. For philosophers, since Frege, they include the ability of an NP to support anaphora, to be replaceable by quantificational NPs, and to serve as arguments of ordinary (i.e. extensional) predicates (Frege 1892, Hale 1987). For syntacticians, referential NPs also must satisfy certain syntactic conditions (having the more complex structure of a DP rather than just an NP, the category of predicative NPs).

 The notion of a referential NP (or ’name’ as it was called at the time) already played a central role in Frege’s (1892) philosophy of language and provided *a syntactic criterion for objecthood*: for Frege, an object is what can be the semantic value of a referential NP (using the contemporary term). Standing for an object is the contribution of a referential NP in the context of a sentence (Frege’s Context Principle).

Entities may play also the role of implicit arguments, that is, as arguments of predicates without also being the semantic values of a referential NP. Thus, on Davidson‘s (1967) influential analysis, the sentence *John walked slowly* states that there is an event which, together with John, is an argument of *walk* and of which *slowly* (now treated as a predicate of events) is true. The very same arguments that lead Davidson, to posit events as implicit arguments apply to adjectives and motivate tropes (particularized properties) as arguments of adjectives. Thus, *John is profoundly happy* will state that there is manifestation of happiness (a trope) that, together with John, is an argument of *happy* and of which *profoundly* is true (Moltmann 2009, 2013a).

 Another important semantic role of entities in the semantic structure of natural language sentences is that of a parameter of evaluation for the truth of sentences. The standard semantic view takes a sentence to be true or false not absolutely, but relative to a time and a (possible) world. Possible worlds are generally treated as parameters of evaluation for the semantics of modals and conditionals, and times often for the semantics of tenses and temporal adverbials. In the more recent development of truthmaker semantics (Fine 2017b), situations play somewhat similar roles for the semantics of conditionals and modals, but as truthmakers of sentences.

 Natural language reflects also ontological categories with some of its syntactic categories or features. Thus, verbs are generally taken to reflect the category of events (Szabo 2015). Adjectives generally reflect the category of qualities or tropes (that is, particularized properties or concrete property manifestations) (Williams 1953, Woltersdorff 1970, Moltmann 2009). The category singular count noun conveys unity or singularity, the category plural noun plurality. Natural language also reflects metaphysical notions of various sorts, such as part-whole relations (Moltmann 1997), constitution (Fine 2003, King 2006), causation (Swanson 2012), (time- and space-relative) existence (Fine 2006, Moltmann 2013d), and existence of the past (the presentism debate) (Szabo 2007). Besides syntactic categories or features, natural language displays particular types of expressions conveying ontological notions, such as modality (*may, must*), existence or ways of being (*exist, occur, obtain*), ontological dependence (*have*), part-whole relations (*part of, whole, partially, completely*), causation (*make*), and truth (*true, correct*).

**1.2. The connection between ontology and compositionality**

The ontology of natural language is intimately linked to compositionality, the chief tenet of natural language semantics. Whether and how entities play a role in the semantic structure of natural language depends very much on the way the contribution of occurrences of expressions to the composition of the meaning of the sentence is conceived. Generally the contribution ofreferential NPs is taken to be that of standing for an object and the role of expressions acting as predicates to take objects as arguments and to yield truth values. Without positing entities as semantic values of referential NPs and without positing properties of entities or relations among them as semantic values of predicates, compositionality is hardly possible, or so it seems. The same predicates should (generally) express the same property with different referential NPs, and the same referential NP should (generally) stand for the same entity with different predicates.

**1.3. Derivative and language-driven entities as semantic values of referential NPs**

Referential NPs display a great range of highly derivative entities, many of which philosophers may not be willing to accept. Yet, the NPs satisfy the very same criteria of referentiality as NPs standing for less controversial entities, let’s call the latter ‘ordinary referential NPs’. They go along with the same sorts of predicates as ordinary referential NPs, support anaphoric pronouns can be replaced by quantificational NPs.

 Referential NPs allow reference to derivative entities that are ontologically dependent on others such as artifacts of various sorts, collections that come with a structure or function (classes, groups, teams, orchestras), kinds (with definite NPs of the sort *the Siberian tiger*), as well as ‘disturbances’ such as shadows, holes, folds, and tropes (particularized properties).

 Natural language displays a particularly rich ontology of tropes or trope-related entities, which include complex manifestations of various sorts of non-natural properties (John’s happiness, Socrates’ wisdom) as well as tropes such as strengths and weakness as distinct order-constituted tropes and quasi-relational tropes such as John’s tallness, as distinct from the ordinary quantitative trope John’s height (Moltmann 2009, 2013a).

 Derivative entities of this sort also appear to be part of the naïve ontology of ordinary speakers (non-philosophers). This may not be so, however, for another part of the ontology that natural language displays, namely what one may call a *language-driven ontology*. Referential NPs for entities in that ontology include:

(1) definite plurals, which stand for (unrestricted) pluralities of entities (Link 1983,

 Champollion/Krifka 2017, Moltmann 1997):

 *the students, Quine and the Eiffeltower*

(2) definite mass NPs, which stand for (unrestricted) quantities (Link 1983, Moltmann 1997):

 *the water and the wine,*  *the water in this area*

(3) bare (determinerless) plurals and mass nouns, which can stand for unrestricted kinds

 (Carlson 1977):

 *empty seats* (as in *empty seats are rare*), *clean water* (as in *clean water is important*)

(4) definite NPs that stand for variable objects (Fine 1999, Moltmann 2013a, to appear a):

 *the water in the container* (as in *the water in the container has increased*), *the book John*

 *needs to write*

(5) definite intentional NP that may stand for merely conceived (nonexistent) entities

 (Moltmann 2016a):

 *the building mentioned in the guide, the trio John is planning*

The dominant view about definite plurals and conjunctions is that they stand for pluralities that are sums in the sense of extensional mereology (where sum formation is unrestricted). Thus *the children* stands for the sum of the contextually relevant children and *Quine and the Eiffetower* for the sum of the two individuals. Plurals share predicates with singular NPs and come with plural specific collective predicates, they support anaphora, and can be replaced ordinary quantificational NPs

 There is no universal agreement, however, that definite plurals stand for pluralities conceived as single entities that are sums. Thus, it has been pointed out that that account fails to distinguish the one (singular count) and the many (plural) (Yi 2005, 2006, Moltmann 2016b). For example, the semantic value of *the children* below could not be counted as a single entity:

(6) John counted the children and the adults (and he counted two: the sum of the children and

 the sum of the adults).

(6) fails to have a reading on which John counted two: the sum of the children and the sum of the adults. Another argument against the mereological account is the reading of the predicate *exist*. Thus, *exist* below cannot apply to ‘the children’, stating the existence of the plurality independently of the existence of the individual children:

(7) The children exist.

Such considerations have led to the exploration of alternative views, on which definite mass NPs plurally refer to the each child at once (Yi 2005, 2006, Oliver/Smiley 2013, Moltmann 2016b). Similar considerations apply to bare plurals and mass nouns and definite mass NPs and motivate an account based on plural reference for bare plurals and mass NPs (Moltmann 2013a) and primitive mass reference for mass NPs (McKay 2016, Laycock 2006).

 Setting aside such caveats regarding (1)-(3), it is clear that natural language involves its own ontology distinct from the ontology of what there really is, an ontology that is in part language-driven.

**2. How can natural language ontology be situated within metaphysics?**

The observation that natural language ontology involves a rich ontology of highly derivative entities has led many philosophers to reject natural language as a guide to ontology, that is, the ontology of the real. The subject matter of metaphysics, on that view is fundamental reality, not the ontology reflected in language. But then natural language ontology no longer has a place within metaphysics.

 But this is not the only way of conceiving of metaphysics. There are alternative conceptions of metaphysics which are not just focused on the fundamental and within which natural language ontology can find its place.

 First of all, there are older traditions of metaphysics that are not focused on reality. One of them is the Kantian tradition, which, for example, deals with ontological categories, but as preconditions of accessing the world, rather than as categories of how things really are. Another is the phenomenological tradition (Brentano, Husserl), where ontology was also pursued, but how things appear, rather than how things really are.

 In the mid-20th century Strawson introduced the distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, which focuses on ontology reflected or not reflected in particular ‘data’. Descriptive metaphysics concerns itself with the ontology that is reflected in our shared intuitions or ordinary judgments, or in fact natural language. By contrast, revisionary metaphysics pursues a better ontology, not reflected in such data. Given that distinction natural language ontology is a branch of descriptive metaphysics.

 Another distinction has recently been made by Fine (2017a), namely between naïve metaphysics and foundational metaphysics. Most, importantly, Fine conceives of their relation in a particular way. The subject matter of the former is what Fine calls *the metaphysics of appearances* reflected in our ordinary judgments; the subject matter of the latter is the ontology of what therereally is. For Fine, the latter must take the former as its starting point: naïve metaphysics cannot be skipped in favor of foundational metaphysics. Rather foundational metaphysics must start out with the notions that naïve metaphysics deals with, in order to possibly explain them in more fundamental terms. As such, naïve metaphysics should be pursued without foundational considerations.

Natural language ontology then has a place within metaphysics, as part of naïve metaphysics, or as I will call it, staying with the better established and less misleading Strawsonian term ‘descriptive metaphysics’.

Fine’s notion of ‘metaphysics of appearances’ is somewhat misleading in that entities in the ontology of natural language cannot be viewed as mere appearances, but rather a distinction between actual and merely conceived entities is needed: generally only the former contribute to the truth of sentences.

**3. What sorts of linguistic data reflect the ontology of natural language and how is the ontology of natural language to be characterized?**

Natural language ontology has as its subject matter the ontology reflected in natural language, or better the *ontology implicit in language*. This raises two central questions:

[1] How is that ontology to be understood, as it cannot be the ontology of fundamental reality?

[2] What sorts of linguistic data do reflect that ontology?

Let us address these two questions in turn.

**3.1. Natural language ontology and folkmetaphysics**

As a first suggestion on might propose that the ontology of natural language is just the ontology of ordinary people, i.e. non-philosophers. However, this cannot be right, the ontology implicit in natural language cannot be the ontology ordinary people (non-philosophers) *naively accept* when thinking about what there is and about the nature of things. That is, natural language ontology is to be distinguished from folkmetaphysics. Folkmetaphysics takes different sorts of data into account. Just like folkphysics and folk biology, folkmetaphysics takes into account assertions, for example:

(8) a. There are artifacts.

 b. Objects are not events.

 c. There are things.

Metaphysics assertions, however, play no role for natural language ontology. No philosopher or linguist in fact would appeal to assertions as in (8) when arguing that natural language reflects an ontology of artifacts or objects distinct from events, or of entities as such. What matters for natural language ontology rather are metaphysical presuppositions, presuppositions of ontological categories carried by referential NPs or quantifiers, by predicates, for example, as well as the content of metaphysically relevant expressions.

 There are also linguistic data that natural language ontology will take into account, but not folkmetaphysics, for example sentences that involve ontological commitments not accessible to ordinary speakers by, for example, containing silent syntactic elements with ontological content, as would be the case according to the sorts of syntactic structures posited in generative syntax.[[2]](#footnote-2)

 The ontology of natural language thus should be understood an ontology that speakers *implicitly accept*, not as an ontology speakers naively accept when thinking about what there is:

(9) Characterization of the ontology implicit in natural language (1st version)

 The ontology of natural language is the ontology speakers implicitly accept.

This notion of implicit acceptance a particularly robust one. It is a form of acceptance that resists rejection upon reflection. Ordinary speakers may reject entities in the language-driven ontology that natural language displays, unrestricted pluralities, unrestricted kinds, variable objects, or conceived objects, say. Yet anyone that uses the relevant NPs will use them taking such entities as semantic values, and thus accept them implicitly. Implicit acceptance of the ontology implicit in natural language is mandatory for users of the language. In that sense the notion of implicit acceptance is rather different from the notion of implicit acceptance in ethics. In the context of ethics, what is implicitly accepted (bias) permits rejection upon reflection. This indicates that at least part of the ontology reflected in language has the very same status as core syntax (in generative syntax), being implicit knowledge that cannot be subject to revision. What distinguishes ontology from syntax, though, is that it is also the subject matter of a particular branch of philosophy.

**3.2. Natural language ontology and cognitive ontology**

The ontology implicit in natural language cannot just be understood just as our implicitly accepted cognitive ontology. This would be too broad and in part not correct. For example, natural language appears to distinguish the semantic values of *the rice, the rice grains* and *the heap of rice*: the rice grains can be (internally) distinguished, compared, listed, or counted, but not so for the rice or the heap of rice (Moltmann 1997). Thus, ‘the rice’, ‘the rice grains’ and ‘the heap of rice’ have different properties and thus appear to be distinct entities. In perception, by contrast, the distinction between ‘the rice’, ‘the rice grains’, and ‘the heap of rice’ hardly matters. Mass nouns such as *water*, *rice, police force, footwear* appear to stand for distinct entities from those of plural counterparts such as *water quantities*, *rice grains, policemen,* and *shoes* (the latter can be counted, distinguished, and enumerated, for example, but not the former). Moreover, unrestricted sum formation does not seem plausible as part of our perception-related cognitive ontology, where formation of sums appears restricted by ‘gestalt conditions’, perceivable conditions of integrity. The ontology of natural language is at least in part an ontology closely related to language (its language-driven part) and should be characterized as below:

(10) Characterization of the ontology implicit in natural language ontology (2nd version)

 The ontology of natural language is the ontology a speaker implicitly accepts *when* using

 natural language.

Of course not all of the ontology of natural language is part of the language-driven part, but rather may be part of cognitive ontology in general, as is plausible for artifacts and various ontologically dependent entities.

**3.3. Natural language ontology and the core-periphery distinction**

The characterization of the ontology of natural language in (10) is still not correct. The ontology of natural language is not reflected in all of natural language. Throughout history, philosophers, when appealing to natural language for motivating a particular ontological view, made use of certain types of expressions or uses of expressions and not others. Thus, philosophers’ technical terms or other terms whose use requires a degree of philosophical reflection are not considered indicative of the ontology of natural language, for example *the property of being happy* or *the truth value true*. Philosophical terms and non-ordinary, philosophical uses of natural language expressions, even though they are part of the legitimate use of natural language, do not reflect the ontology implicit in natural language. Otherwise natural language could reflect any ontology whatsoever that someone may come up with. For example, a particular philosopher may just introduce a technical term for some ontological category, say, that of a platonic universal or that of ‘the nothing’, of but this does not make that category (platonic universals or the nothing) part of the ontology implicit in language.

 The distinction to be made is that between the *core* of language and its *periphery* (Moltmann 2013a, 2017, 2019, to appear d). Only expressions in the core reflect the ontology of natural language, not expressions in the periphery. The core-periphery distinction is essential for natural language ontology. It has been relied on by philosophers throughout history when making appeal to linguistic examples, and it likewise guides the practice of contemporary semanticists and philosophers pursuing natural language ontology.

 The periphery includes *reifying NPs* , that is, NPs of the sort *the number eight, the property of being happy, the proposition that it is raining*, or *the truth value true*. Reifying NPs introduce objects on the basis of a sortal and possibly nonreferential material (*eight, being happy, true, that* S (on a view on which that-clauses are nonreferential)). Clearly, reifying NPs may introduce entities that need not be considered part of the ontology of natural language (truth values, abstract properties, propositions, and numbers). Philosophers in fact have generally stayed away from reifying NP when appealing to natural language for motivating an ontological category. For example, Frege (1884) did not motivate numbers as objects appealing the presence of the construction *the number eight* in natural language, and he did not motivate truth values as objects by appealing to *the truth value true*. Rather he used expressions like *the number of planets* and *eight* from the core of language when arguing for numbers being objects, and his motivations for considering truth values objects did not come from particular natural language sentences at all. Hale (1987) did not argue for properties being objects on the basis of terms like *the property of mercy*, but simple terms *mercy* (from the core of language). Link (1983) did not motivate sums being part of the ontology of language on the basis of terms like *the sum of the students*, but simple definite plurals like *the students* (which clearly belong to the core of language).

 Reference to the core-periphery distinction is indispensable for the right characterization of the ontology implicit in natural language (Moltmann 2017b, 2019):

(12) Characterization of the ontology of natural language (final version)

 The ontology of natural language is the ontology a speaker *implicitly accepts* when

 making use of the *core* of language.

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**4. Universals of natural language ontology**

The core-periphery distinction is also essential for the quest for universals of natural language ontology. Clearly, the core in the present sense, not the periphery (in that sense) can represent a form of universal cognitive language-related ontology. The existing work in natural language ontology certainly incorporates an implicit restriction to the core of language for generalizations meant to be universal. The core-periphery distinction is used explicitly in the general hypothesis about reference to abstract objects in natural language in Moltmann (2013a):

(13) The Abstract-Objects Hypothesis

 Natural language does not involve reference to abstract objects in its core, but only in its

 periphery.

On that hypothesis, in the core of natural language, what appeared to be expressions referring to abstract objects (numbers, properties, properties, propositions, degrees, expression types) are in fact expressions referring to particulars, pluralities of (actual or possible) particulars, or variable objects, or expressions that fail to have a referential function in the first place (numerals, clausal complements, predicative complements, complements of intensional transitive verbs). The particulars include tropes, to which natural language displays pervasive reference; tropes include quantitative tropes such as John’s height or the number of planets (a number trope). Only in the periphery is reference to abstract objects possible, for example through the use of reifying terms such as *the number eight*, *the property of being happy,* or *the proposition that it is raining.*

 The periphery raises questions of its own. The periphery is a legitimate part of natural language, or a legitimate extension of it. As such, it has a semantics and hence comes with an ontology. But that ontology may diverge from the ontology of the core. The question then is, how should the ontology of the periphery be understood, in particular, when it is not part of the ontology of the core of natural language? Here it is important to keep in mind that ontology may just mean the ontology of appearances. Ontology for the purpose of compositional semantics may include merely conceived entities, philosophical entities on some philosopher’s conception, not necessarily the ontology of actual entities, let alone real entities.

**5. The syntactic core-periphery distinction**

The core-periphery distinction raises an important question, namely whether there is a linguistic basis for the distinction. That is, are there syntactic or lexical conditions that determine which expressions (or uses of expressions) will be part of the periphery rather than the core?

 The core-periphery distinction recalls the core-periphery distinction that Chomsky’s (1981, 2006) introduced for syntax (and which Chomsky (p.c.) still thinks is essential for syntax). For Chomsky, very roughly, the core of the syntactic system of a language represents regularities and in fact universal grammar, whereas the periphery involves exceptions and parts of language added on from outside influences. The question then is whether two separate core-periphery distinctions should be made for syntax and for the ontology of natural language.

 At first, the core in the syntactic sense and the core in ontological sense do not seem to coincide. For example *the number eight* belongs to the periphery in the present sense, but at the same time seems to belong to the core in Chomsky’s sense. However, a different view becomes plausible when the focus is not on entire constructions, but on more elementary parts of language. For Yang (2015), who more recently revived and defended the core-periphery distinction in syntax, functional categories (syntactic categories and features) belong to the syntactic core, but the lexicon to the periphery. Given that, the peripheral status of the reifying NP *the number eight* can be attributed to the occurrence of the sortal *number* in that construction, rather than the construction as such.

 Further support for a single core-periphery distinction comes from the ability or inability of an expression or syntactic element to allow for a non-ordinary use or ‘conceptual engineering’ (Eklund 2015, Cappelen 2018). Lexical categories such as sortal nouns allow for non-ordinary uses, but not so, it seems, functional categories (e.g. (overt or empty) determiners, morpho-syntactic categories (plural, tense)) or syntactic constructions.

While it is plausible that functional and structural meaning side with the core (in the present sense), it is not obvious that all of the lexicon belongs to the periphery (in the present sense). For example, the verb *exist* appears to belong to the core (not permitting a non-ordinary use), whereas the non-relational bare noun *existence* belongs to the periphery (Moltmann 2019, to appear c). Thus, while philosophers and non-philosophers are likely to consider ‘existence’ a univocal notion applying to every actual thing, the predicate *exist* in fact applies only to material and abstract objects, not to events (*the rain still exists* or *the accident existed yesterday* are unacceptable, cf. Hacker 1982, Cresswell 1986, Moltmann 2013b). That holds regardless of a language user’s (naïve or not so naïve) philosophical views, which would mean that *exist* belongs to the core. By contrast, the bare nominalization *existence* (on its non-relational use) can easily be used to convey any notion of existence a language use may subscribe to (as in the sentence *existence is a univocal notion*).[[3]](#footnote-3)

**6. The ontology of natural language and other ontologies**

Given the perspective of descriptive metaphysics, there is not a single ontology of the real, but rather different ontologies reflected indifferent ranges of data can coexist, including different ontologies reflected in different peripheries of natural language and different ontologies for different cognitive domains.[[4]](#footnote-4) This perspective requires new formats for ontologies theories. Ontology can now no longer be based on a fixed set of categories and their characteristic properties and relations. Rather, it goes along better with a constructional ontology (Fine 1991), where various ontological operations may lead to different ranges of entities for different ontologies.

 A constructional ontology is also particularly suited for complex expressions in natural language that serve the introduction of entities, namely reifying NPs of the sort  *the number eight* or *the truth value true*, by some form of abstraction (Hale 1987, Wright 1983) or the introduction of pleonstaic entites (Schiffer 1996). Reifying terms require a distinction between the acceptance of an ontological operation interpreting complex NPs expressions and the acceptance of the outcome or actually applying the operation. Syntactic knowledge of the construction of reifying terms will go along with acceptance of the ontological operation of reification interpreting that construction, but not with the acceptance of the outcome of that operation, that is, the application of the operation in particular cases.

 By contrast, syntactic knowledge of the constructions in (1) – (5) will go along with acceptance of the ontological operations interpreting them as well as the acceptance of the outcome. Thus, knowledge of English, with the constructions in (1) – (5) goes along with a mandatory implicit acceptance of the entities the constructions in (1) – (5) stand for. Their acceptance cannot be subject to revision upon reflection, just as syntactic knowledge cannot be revised. For the language-driven part of the ontology, then, ontology, based on ontological operations introducing derivative entities, can be considered on a par with syntax.[[5]](#footnote-5)

**7. Why should natural language ontology be pursued?**

Natural language ontology has a well-defined subject matter, a cognitive ontology that goes along with the use of language. This makes it a worthwhile pursuit in itself. However, there are other reasons for a philosopher to pursue it.

 First, as Fine (2017a) argues, descriptive metaphysics is presupposed by foundational metaphysics, which has as one of its aims the clarification of the notions that foundational metaphysics must take as its starting point. At least for some of those notions linguistic data may be particularly relevant and thus require the pursuit of natural language ontology.

 Second, in at least some areas, descriptive metaphysics and specifically natural language ontology is the only metaphysics to pursue and not foundational metaphysics, in particular in the areas of the ontology of the mind and of social ontology.

 Finally, natural language ontology may shed a new light on longstanding philosophical puzzles. A great range of philosophical views, for example about ontological categories, about propositions, about truth and truthbearers, about numbers, and about the constitution of material objects have been motivated, at least in part, by appeal to natural language. Often such an appeal, however, turns out to be based on a naïve, incomplete or mistaken analysis of linguistic data. It is hence important to analyse the full range of relevant linguistic data properly in order to uncover the ontology they in fact involve. Often then a deeper linguistic analysis provides new philosophical solutions or perspectives on the philosophical issues.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**8. Conclusion**

Natural language ontology is a branch of descriptive metaphysics whose subject matter is the ontology implicit in natural language. As such it is a new discipline that is both part of philosophy and linguistics, as well as a practice that had been pursued throughout the history of philosophy.

 Natural language ontology had faced serious challenges being recognized as a discipline. There are three reasons for that. The first is the foundationalist orientation of contemporary metaphysics. Metaphysics has enjoyed a significant revival in the 20th century. However, it has to a great extent been focused on foundational metaphysics, pursuing questions of ultimate reality, in line with physics and some of the other natural sciences. The pursuit of descriptive metaphysics, as metaphysics focused on the ontology in linguistic or language-independent intuitions, had not been given the same importance.

 The second reason is the formal orientation of Montague Grammar (‘English as a formal language’), which had dominated linguistic semantics for the last decades (Thomason 1974). In that tradition, the purpose of formal semanticists has been considered that of developing logical analyses of parts of natural language that can explain intuitively valid inferences. With that as its main aim, there was little concern in natural language semantics as to the ontological-cognitive status of the formal notions used in that analysis (say, the elements in posited in the model-theory).

 The third reason is Chomsky’s rejection of referentialist semantics. Chomsky (1986, 1998, 2013) took an entirely skeptical stance as to whether language involves reference to entities, and thus did not encourage setting out a research agenda for natural language ontology within generative linguistics. Chomsky’s scepticism was based on the view that ontology concerns only mind-independent reality (with the reference being able to relate only to objects in such a reality). Chomsky’s rejection of the involvement of ontology in natural language also had to do with Chomsky’s exclusive focus on referential NPs. For Chomsky, natural language terms, including artifact terms, terms for cities, terms like *the typical student*, cannot stand for objects in a mind-independent reality (or even objects on any standard understanding of the term, including conceived objects). Chomsky‘s example generally involve property attributions associated with a referential NP that violate standard conditions on objecthood (e.g. one can paint a door, but also walk through it). Chomsky’s conclusion that natural language does not involve ontology, however, is is need of review, however, given the distinction between foundational and descriptive metaphysics (‘the metaphysics of appearances’) and given the fact that ontology is reflected in many other parts of language than just referential NPs. Moreover there are promising recent ontological and lexical approaches that permit a reanalysis of Chomsky-style examples (variable objects, multi-faceted objects, the generative lexicon), which Chomsky did not take into consideration.

 Natural language ontology as a discipline on its own not only has a well-defined subject matter. It may also set its own ambitions on a par with that of generative syntax, aiming for a universal ontology associated with the core of language, not subject to revision

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1. Bach (1986) uses the term ‘natural language metaphysics’ for natural language ontology, See also Chao/Bach 2012, Pelletier 2011, Kratzer 1989, Asher 1993) . This is in a sense more adequate in that ontology is generally taken to be narrower than metaphysics, dealing with what there is rather than with the nature of things (and both are dealt with by metaphysics). However, ‘ontology’ is increasingly used in the broader sense of metaphysics as well, in particular when it has an empirical connection (‘applied ontology’). Also ‘ontology’ is more usable when talking about the subject matter of a discipline, in particular since it has a plural: *the ontology of natural language* is the subject matter of natural language ontology, and there are different *ontologies* that are the subject matter of different branches of metaphysics. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. An example is the silent noun theory of Kayne (2005, 2015), which posits various silent nouns such as age, number, height etc. as part of apparently simpler syntactic structure suggesting that those structures involve reference to ages, numbers, and heights. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Another question that arises is whether a separate core-periphery distinction should be made in the conceptual domain, with an invariant conceptual core not permitting conceptual engineering (the ‘conceptual fixed points’ of Eklund 2015 or the ‘bedrock concepts’ of Chalmers 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. There is of course also the issue of the universality of the ontology of natural language, touching upon the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and the controversy surrounding it (Pinker 1982, Hespos / Spelke 2004). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Note that on that view the ontology is not representational, since semantic values of referential NPs are not considered representations. Rather it is a constructional ontology of actual, though derivative and possibly mind-dependent entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Some examples from my own work concern difficulties for the notion of an abstract proposition (Moltmann 2013a, 2017) and for abstract objects generally (Moltmann 2013a)), apparent relative identity statements (Moltmann 2013b). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)