**First-person-based genericity, predicates of taste and the theory of meaning**

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In my previous work (Moltmann 2010, 2012), I proposed that the intuitions of faultless disagreement with sentences expressing judgments of personal taste are due to a form of first-person-based genericity, that is, the kind of genericity overtly expressed by generic *one*, which conveys a personal experience (or simulated experience) generalized to anyone the agent identifies with. The proposal was not further elaborated with respect to how first-person based genericity contributes to truth conditions and can be part of a compositional semantic theory of sentence meaning. Moreover, it was not made clear how exactly it relates to the lexical meaning of predicates of personal taste as well as other predicates for which it would also be invoked, such as aesthetic and moral predicates. This paper will elaborate these issues

References:

F. Moltmann: 'Relative Truth and the First Person'. Philosophical Studies 150(2), 2010, pp. 187-220

F. Moltmann: 'Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content'.  Synthese 184.2, 2012, pp. 157-177.